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Recently, the Thüringian State Supreme Court sided with the populist, far-right
Alternative for Germany’s (AfD), declaring Thüringen’s new parity electoral law
gender quota unconstitutional. Many of the AfD’s and the male-dominated court’s
arguments against the law are common worldwide in debates about quotas. In an
increasing number of democracies around the globe, however, quotas have not
only survived constitutional challenges but have come to be seen as an essential
mechanism for achieving political equality. Empirical research has determined many
common concerns about quotas are unfounded. Here I provide some responses to
the AfD’s and the Court’s worries about the law, drawn from the extensive political
science literature on gender quotas. 
Free elections and parties’ freedom of action
The Court found the parity law unconstitutional because it clashed with the
constitutional imperative of free elections and parties’ freedom of action, arguing that
“elections cannot be influenced by coercion and pressure from the state and that the
process of interest aggregation must occur ‘free of the state’.” (Das Paritätsgesetz
beeinträchtigt das Recht auf Freiheit … der Wahl (Art. 46 Abs. 1 ThürVerf) sowie das
Recht der politischen Parteien auf Betätigungsfreiheit… (Art. 21 Abs. 1 GG … dass
Wahlen nicht durch Zwang und Druck von staatlicher Seite beeinflusst werden und
dass der Prozess der Willensbildung des Volkes „staatsfrei“ verläuft)
Both the AfD and the Court make much of the facts that the parity law would limit
the number of candidates on a party list, curtail the ability of voters to influence the
composition of a party list, and constrain who parties could nominate for their lists.
Opponents of quotas in other contexts have similarly argued that parity policies
restrict freedom by setting limits about who can appear on a ballot. The status quo
electoral law is perceived as neutral, natural, or “free” and these changes a novel
limit on freedom.
Such objections resemble citizen complaints currently being made in the United
States about public policies requiring masks to be worn in stores and other public
places. Protestors argue their freedom is being taken away because the government
has begun to require them to don certain articles of clothing in public; however,
the legal status quo already limits these freedoms. Laws requiring people to wear
shoes in stores and banning public nudity are common; rules against indoor smoking
and other public health-related policies are also in place having survived legal
challenges. New mask requirements are simply a variation on well-established limits
to public behavior.
Similarly, although it is easy (especially for men) to imagine German democracy in
the absence of quotas as completely free, electoral laws in the Federal Republic
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already constrain the actions of both voters and political parties. The AfD argues
quotas limit the number of men they could place on their party list and curtail their
freedom to select additional excellent male candidates for public office. However,
the Erststimme component of Germany’s federal and state mixed electoral laws
already constrains the number of men a political party can place on a portion of the
ballot, limiting the party to only one candidate. Most parties certainly could locate
more than one excellent candidate to represent their electoral district – indeed
closely-contested battles take place within many local party organizations when an
incumbent retires and a new candidate to represent the district must be selected. No
matter how many good men a party would like to select to represent their Wahlkreis,
however, current German electoral law allows them to select only one for the ballot.
State imposed limits to parties’ freedom of action already exist. 
The Court’s decision additionally claims the parity law unfairly constricts political
parties by forbidding them to place certain people (men) in certain places (women’s
places) on their lists. Parties would still, however, be free to place those men
elsewhere on their list.1)This logic is also extended to citizens who would like to
run for elective office, arguing their freedom to complete for a particular spot on the
party list would be denied. Again, however, these individuals’ right to compete for
other spots on the list would not be impinged upon. German citizens are already
limited in the offices for which they can compete; see the remained of this paragraph
for examples. In contrast, current law forbids political parties from placing certain
candidates anywhere on their list. Thüringen’s state electoral law bans candidates
who are under 18 years of age, have not lived in the state for a year, or who belong
to another elected body such as the Bundestag. Existing electoral law already
completely curtails parties’ freedom to include people in these categories on their list
— even if party members desire them as representatives.   
Similarly, the argument that requiring men and women to alternate places on a party
list is unconstitutional because it violates citizens’ freedom to determine individual
representatives is an argument at odds with Germany’s long-time use of closed party
lists for national and most state level elections. Under the electoral system used
since the founding of the Federal Republic (and in Thüringen since 1990), ordinary
voters have never been able to impact the composition and rank order of party lists
in a national election. The state has already deprived them of this freedom. 
Only by joining a political party and actively taking part in pre-election candidate
selection meetings can a citizen shape the composition of a party list. Moreover, in
larger parties not all party members, only a few people who have been “deputized”
by their local party organization, take part in the selection meetings – meetings in
which the party leadership generally presents a previously constructed list for the
rank-and-file’s consideration. Under the parity law, this tiny fraction of the German
citizenry would still be free to determine which men in which rank order and which
women in which rank order to place on a party list. If a citizen cannot find a party
with which she agrees, or cannot afford the dues or the time to devote to active
party membership, or is a party member not “deputized” to attend such a meeting,
her ability to shape a party list and her individual representatives has already been
curtailed by German electoral law. 
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Quota opponents’ argument that the parity electoral law introduces unheard of
restrictions on parties and voters into otherwise neutral and “staatsfrei” elections
finds little empirical support. 
Fair elections and equal chances for parties
The court further found the parity law unconstitutional because it violated the
constitutional imperative of fair elections and equal chances for parties. (Das
Paritätsgesetz beeinträchtigt das Recht auf … Gleichheit der Wahl (Art. 46 Abs. 1
ThürVerf) sowie das Recht der politischen Parteien auf … Chancengleichheit (Art. 21
Abs. 1 GG)
The AfD and the court argue the parity law would place parties with low numbers of
female members at a competitive disadvantage because they would be unable to
locate qualified female candidates to run on their electoral lists, artificially curtailing
the length of their list and hence the number of candidates from their party who
could be elected. Moreover, this school of thought maintains, parties attempting to
appeal to male voters by running male-heavy lists (or vice versa) would be denied
this opportunity to gain an electoral edge. Around the world, opponents of quotas
have agreed with the AfD’s concern that quotas would force parties both to select
unqualified female candidates to fill women’s slots and to shunt qualified male
candidates aside, rendering them less competitive. 
Extensive empirical research has determined these concerns to be unfounded.
Where quotas are implemented elected officials became more qualified, not
less. Rather than a gender-balanced ticket being an electoral liability, citizens
have greater trust in gender-balanced groups of legislators and perceive them as
more legitimate than bodies dominated by men. CSU party leader Horst Seehofer
recognized this logic a decade ago, leading his party to adopt quotas for inner-party
offices to stem ballot box losses. It is notable that despite the AfD’s claims that parity
would hurt their electoral chances, the party voluntarily chose to act as if it had a
quota in the 2017 German national election, mimicking the Greens and the Left
party’s quotas in their choice of a “Spitzenduo” to lead their election campaign. 
In the twentieth century, members of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and
Christian Democratic Union (CDU) – like the Court — also feared that if their
parties were to voluntarily adopt gender quotas for electoral lists they would be
unable to fulfill them due to a dearth of (qualified) women. These concerns were
in part driven by the observation (shared by the Court) that only a minority of party
members were women. These fears did not materialize and German parties have
largely complied with their quota promises2)My research finds the main instances
where parties are routinely unable to fulfill quotas occur in elections to local councils
in small communities where a given party does not have a large membership.
Limiting the number of candidates from a party that cannot attract a lot of members
is hardly an example of unfair electoral competition.; Hilde Coffe’s and my analysis of
party lists for the 2017 Bundestag election found no shortage of women competing
for electable list places in parties where quotas are used. Parties with voluntary
quotas developed mentoring and training programs now enjoyed by both female
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and male aspirants for public office. Parties employing voluntary quotas also began
casting a broader net for potential candidates. For example, because county councils
often oversee hospitals, before adopting quotas parties recruited (male) doctors
as candidates; quotas led them to begin recruiting (female) nurses for their lists.
Rather than putting them at a competitive disadvantage, more diverse lists enabled
parties to reach a wider range of potential constituents and to better represent the
concerns of hospitals as well. Declaring a law unconstitutional due to concerns
about some parties’ inability to compete with other parties that have developed
broader ways of identifying and training candidates who more completely reflect the
underlying citizenry is a strange way of promoting fair elections. A better response to
this concern would require an amendment to the law gradually phasing in the quota
over several electoral periods.    
Political parties’ programmatic freedom
Thirdly, the Court argues against the parity law maintaining that it has a negative
impact on political parties’ programmatic freedom. (Das Paritätsgesetz beeinträchtigt
… das Recht der politischen Parteien auf Programmfreiheit (Art. 21 Abs. 1 GG))
The internal logic supporting this position in both the Court’s decision and the AfD’s
challenge to the law is contradictory. On the one hand, both maintain the law is
unconstitutional because it improperly divides the citizenry / potential candidates into
groups based on sex when the representatives’ job is to represent the citizenry (das
Volk) as a whole rather than a subset of the population. (“Die Abgeordneten sind
nicht einem Land, einem Wahlkreis, einer Partei oder einer Bevölkerungsgruppe,
sondern dem ganzen Volk gegenüber verantwortlich; sie repräsentieren das
Volk grundsätzlich in ihrer Gesamtheit.” ”Gruppenrepräsentation sei mit dem
Demokratieprinzip unvereinbar.”) On the other hand, however, the Decision argues
that the parity law deprives parties of their programmatic freedom to try and appeal
especially to male voters (by running many male candidates) or to try and win over
female voters (by running a plethora of female candidates). 
If we accept the first premise as valid, then it is difficult to see how the parity law
would limit the programmatic freedom of political parties. If representatives are truly
neutral embodiments of the citizenry as a whole, women can easily represent a
party platform designed to appeal to men. Indeed, women in the AfD have spoken
out against quotas for women in politics; a parity quota would not limit their freedom
to continue with this stance. Conversely, male leaders such as former US President
Barak Obama have declared themselves feminists and fought to appeal to female
voters. Alternating the sex of candidates on a party list does not limit the freedom of
a party to select policy positions in its program.  
If the latter premise, that men and women do bring separate and distinct
programmatic attributes as candidates, is correct, then serious democratic harm
is done by the current systematic underrepresentation of women on some party
lists. Parity quotas correct this problem. Empirical evidence suggests that male
and female members of the same political party hold slightly different policy
positions and prioritize different issues. Gender-imbalanced lists and in turn
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the parliaments they produce systematically underrepresent the concerns of
half the population. Where quotas have been implemented, the same political
majorities adopt different policy positions; spending on health, education, and
welfare increase while fewer resources are devoted to security issues.
The AfD’s challenge to the parity law makes very clear its unwillingness to represent
the interests of women within its ranks. It opposes parity because it would “exercise
pressure on parties to align their programs so that they would appeal both to women
and men” (“dass auf die Parteien mittelbar Druck ausgeübt werde, ihre Programme
so auszurichten, dass diese sowohl für Frauen als auch für Männer attraktiv seien.”).
This aversion by a political party toward appealing to half of the population is
particularly concerning when it comes from a party already under observation for the
Office of Constitutional Protection. 
Political parties shall participate in the formation of
the political will of the people
Finally, some thoughts on Article 21, Paragraph 1, to which the court paid special
attention: Political parties shall participate in the formation of the political will of the
people. … Their internal organization must conform to democratic principles. (“Die
Parteien wirken bei der politischen Willensbildung des Volkes mit. … Ihre innere
Ordnung muß demokratischen Grundsätzen entsprechen.”)
In its decision, the Court stressed that these democratic principles are particularly
important in terms of the process of forming political opinions and determining
the will of the collective (“die ‘demokratischen Grundsätze’ im Sinne des Art. 21
Abs. 1 Satz 3 GG auf das Verfahren der politischen Meinungs- und Willensbildung
beziehen, also auf die Rückführbarkeit verbindlicher Normen auf den Willen eines
kollektiven Subjekts.”). Indeed, parties were given their near-monopoly on candidate
selection in Germany precisely because the founders of the Federal Republic
believed that the large memberships of what were then truly Volksparteien were
capable of channeling the political will of the people into parliament. 
Seventy years later, my research and that of others finds German political parties
in a very different condition than they were decades ago. Party membership
has plummeted and today only approximately 1% of the German population (1.2
million people) has decided to join a political party. In all parties, a majority of
members are men; even in the most gender-balanced party, the Greens, men
comprise over 60% of party members. While civically-engaged women flock to
social movements, charities, and other community organizations, parties remain
unattractive clubs for them to join. Furthermore, other large segments of the German
population, including men with low levels of education and income, young people,
citizens with a migration background, Eastern Germans, and people employed in
the private sector are reluctant to join parties. Today, these groups are dominated
by older, educated, affluent ethnic Western German men who are self-employed
or work in the public sector; in turn, such men are overrepresented in German
legislatures. Over the past decades, parties’ repeated attempts to increase and
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diversify their membership to be more reflective of the German citizenry have failed.
Political parties are increasingly unable to fulfill their constitutionally-mandated
function of collective interest aggregation.
In light of all political parties’ inabilities to attract broad memberships, and Article 3
of the Basic Law’s requirement of the state to promote the actual implementation
of equal rights for men and women, taking steps to eliminate disadvantages that
now exist, parity quotas are a proportionate measure to promote gender equal
participation in democracy.
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